Obviousness-type double patenting in the Age of the Twenty-Year Term and Patent Term Adjustment

Obviousness-type double patenting (ODP) attempts to prevent the term of a “reference patent” claiming an obvious variant of a parent patent to exceed the term of the parent. This fulfills the mandate of the patent statute of “one patent per invention.”

When issuance dates were compared pre URAA (1994), the need to file for terminal disclaimer (TD) in the later-issued patent was simple to resolve. But then came patent term adjustment (PTA) – time tacked onto an expiration date for PTO delay—and URAA (1994)’s twenty years from filing or priority date term –arrived to complicate determination of if and when ODP is an issue.” A common priority date does not always guarantee a common expiration date.” (The quotes are all from Allegan).

The problem is that commonly owned patents that would otherwise expire on the same day due to a shared priority date may have different expiration dates due to award of PTA in one but not the other; or there may be a scattering of expiration dates due to differing PTA’s. “The patent subject to the TD cannot expire on any date later then the parent over which that TD was filed, even if it received [PTA]”. The TD specified expiration date rules.

In re Cellect, 81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the Fed. Cir. established a “rule that, when it comes to evaluating ODP for a patent that has received PTA, the relevant expiration date is the expiration date including PTA. “(Owner had a number of interlocked patents with same priority date and a scattering of varying expiration dates due to different grants of PTA.)

In Allergan v MSN Labs. [and Sun], 111 F. 4th 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2024) the panel spent about 20 pages trying (and succeeding) to arrive at a just conclusion for what initially appeared to be a simple set of facts. In a para IV situation, Allegan sued MSN (“Sun “) for infringement of three patents related to an anti-pain drug. The three comprised the original ‘356 patent, claiming the drug per se, and two continuations—the ‘011 patent and the ‘709 patent. Apart from the key fact that the ‘356 patent had received 467 days of PTA, all three of the patents would have expired on the same date. So did the ‘356 patent improperly grab a much longer expiration date than the other two?

The district court said “yes” to Sun’s argument of improper extension of the term of the ‘356 patent, but Fed. Cir. reversed. The panel found that a finding of improper extension based solely on expiration dates was itself improper. The Court framed the question as “Can a first-filed, first issued, later-expiring claim be invalidated by a later-filed, later issued, earlier-expiring reference claim having a common priority date? We hold that it cannot.”

To rule otherwise would permit a first-issued patent to be treated like a later issued patent that can be invalidated by ODP. “The claims of the ‘356 patent do not “extend or prolong the monopoly [on the drug] beyond the period allowed by law, and therefore are not subject to ODP over the ‘011 and ‘709 patents…  Put otherwise, the fact that the ‘356 patent expires later is of no consequence here because it is not a second later expiring patent for the same invention.” Because the ‘356 patent was the first patent in its family to be filed and to issue it does not extend any period of exclusivity on the claimed subject matter.”

The opinion further distinguishes precedent such as Gilead and Abbvie and uses the facts of Breckenridge to illustrate the injustice of a contrary holding. “A holding [that a first-filed, first-issued] parent patent having received PTA can be invalidated by a later-filed, later issued child parent with less if any PTA] would require patent owners …to file a TD disclaiming any term of the parent [patent] that extends beyond that of the child, which, given that the [parent and child] patents share a priority date, would amount to the disclaimer of only PTA. The parent patent, then would not receive the benefit of its congressionally guaranteed patent term. See 35 USC s.154(b) and would instead be limited to the presumably shorter term of its own child. Such a result would be untenable.”

 

 

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Allergan v. Sun – A Glidant Slips Past the Written Description Requirement

The most interesting part of this decision by the Fed. Cir. (No. 24- 1061, Aug. 13, 2024) is that the court was faced with an argument by Sun that Allergan’s claims in U.S. Pat. No.11,311,516 et al. are invalid as failing to meet the WDR of § 112. Sun argued that the claims of certain of Allergan’s patent thicket were invalid because the specifications did not support a pharmaceutical composition containing the drug eluxadoline with a number of inert ingredients that did not include a “glidant.” In other words, Sun argued that there was no support for the absence of a glidant in any of the patent claims, a component Sun was apparently using in its compositions. Continue reading

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The Chisum Patent Academy Makes an Appearance in Cincinnati

When I was in law school, we had but one treatise to use, the weighty “Choate on Patents” (1973). A number of “horn books” have appeared since, including the authoritative “Chisum on Patents” and his wife’s weighty treatise “Mueller on Patent Law.” With the beehive of information sources buzzing around every patent attorney’s head, any one of us would be wise to keep abreast of developments in IP law, even if they do not appear immediately to impact one’s practice.

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Patent Office Releases Role of AI in Inventorship Determinations

In February, the PTO released “Inventorship Guidance for AI-assisted Inventions (89 CFR 10043) and noted that the Office will issue examples to assist in the examination of applications in accord with this Guidance. I recently finished reading and annotating the Guidance and the Examples, that amounts to a short course on inventorship in all its fact-driven glory. The Guidance goes beyond factors involving the determination of inventorship, and tackles the duties of disclosed in Rule 56 and the duty of reasonable inquiry and the requirements for information. The latter can be made by the examiner “or other USPTO employee” (37 CFR s. 1.105). This can include an inquiry into inventorship and the role of AI in making the invention. Remember, the application cannot name an AI inventor, since AI is not a natural person, but the role that AI played in making the claimed invention may well be relevant to the role(s) played by the named inventors, and that role may not meet the “significant contribution” required by the Pannu standard.(Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir.  1998)). Put another way, “[A] new inventor cannot be named if no natural person made a significant contribution to an AI assisted invention” (89 C.F.R. 10048). So AI can “invent”, just not be named as an inventor on any claim when the application is filed.

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